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Information Detection and Energy Harvesting
Trade-off in Multi-User Secure Communication
Ali Kariminezhad, Zohaib Hassan Awan, Hendrik Vogt, and Aydin Sezgin
Abstract—The secrecy rate region of wiretap interference
channels with a multi-antenna passive eavesdropper is studied
under receiver energy harvesting constraints. To stay operational
in the network, the legitimate receivers demand energy along-
side information, which is fulfilled by power transmission and
exploiting a power splitting (PS) receiver. Simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) results in a reduction
in the secrecy rates due to the legitimate receivers PS for simul-
taneous information detection and energy harvesting. For this
setup, lower-bounds for secure communication rate are derived
without imposing any limitation at the eavesdropper processing.
It turns out that in order to obtain the Pareto boundary of
the secrecy rate region, smart tuning of the transmit power and
receiver PS coefficient is required. Notice that, granting both, i.e.,
secrecy in communication as well as enabling energy harvesting,
result in shrinkages in the reliable communication rate region,
which is captured by this optimal tune. Hence, it is of crucial
importance to investigate, which of these two services shrinks
the rate region more. Interestingly, we observe that by enabling
SWIPT, the convexity of the reliable rate region is preserved.
However, granting secrecy for the communication results in a
non-convex rate region as the interference power increases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is one of the main concerns in future communica-
tion networks involving a plethora of communicating nodes.
This includes wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and Internet of
Things (IoTs) [1], [2]. Moreover, due to a steadily increasing
number of connected devices, the scarce spectrum needs
to be shared among multiple communication pairs. These
two factors motivate the study of the wiretap interference
channel [3]. In this channel, multiple node pairs exchange
data simultaneously over a shared spectrum, which in turn
induces interference at the receivers. One way to tackle this
problem is to treat the undesired signals at the legitimate
receivers as noise — popularly known as treating interference
as noise (TIN). Despite, the interference is treated as noise for
information detection reasons, it can be treated as a energy
source for energy harvesting purposes. This way, securing
the desired information assuming TIN, the legitimate users
demand a particular amount of energy to stay functional
during the communication process [4], [5]. For instance,
consider a WSN with limited energy supply at the sensors.
By deploying energy harvesting receivers, the energy buffer
can be charged wirelessly from energy sources, e.g., solar
energy, radio frequency (RF) [6]. One aspect of this work is to
investigate the concept of RF signal energy harvesting in the
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Fig. 1: K-user wiretap interference channel with power splitting
structure for simultaneous information detection and energy harvest-
ing.
context of security. Now, the sensors with scarce energy supply
face a trade-off in between information detection (ID) and
energy harvesting (EH). Considering a single-antenna receiver,
simultaneous ID and EH can be achieved by power splitting
(PS). Hence, one part of received signal power undergoes
the ID chain while the other part passes through the EH
circuitry. Utilizing PS receivers, the required energy constraint
is fulfilled by appropriate power transmission. This concept
is known as simultaneous wireless information and power
transmission (SWIPT) [7]–[9].
For a class of multi-user networks, the authors in [10], [11]
establish bounds on secure communication region. The secrecy
rate region of the model that we study with EH demands is
a function of — i) the transmit power, and ii) the receive PS
coefficients. Therefore, to establish the secrecy rate region with
EH, it is pivotal to study the joint interaction between transmit
power, and, receive PS coefficients at the legitimate pairs.
Thus, the optimal design of these parameters captures the
trade-off between secure communication rates and harvested
energies.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy rate region of the
wiretap interference channel with EH legitimate users. Char-
acterizing the secrecy capacity of this channel is challenging.
Thus, we focus our attention to develop secure rate lower-
bounds. For both secure communication and energy harvesting
purposes, the transmit power, and receive PS coefficients are
optimized jointly in order to capture the trade-off between
secure rates and energy demands. This optimization problem
is a non-convex problem. Interestingly, this problem turns
out to be a signomial program (SP), which in this work is
approximated by a geometric program (GP). We propose a
polynomial-time algorithm to solve this problem iteratively,
where the approximation gap reduces at each iteration. The
optimal solution sheds light on the rate loss due to secrecy
constraint, meanwhile harvesting a certain amount of RF
energy.
B. Notation
Throughout the paper, we denote vectors in boldface lower-
case letters while the matrices are expressed in boldface upper-
case. The differential entropy of a random variable, x is
denoted by h(x) and the mutual information between two
random variables, x and y is denoted by I(x; y). a ≤ b
represents element-wise comparison between vectors a and b.
Suppose x is a vector of K elements, i.e., x = [x1, · · · , xK ]T ,
then the vector xKk+1 = [xk+1, · · · , xK ]T . Moreover, x\xk
represents vector x excluding the k–th element, i.e., x\xk =
[x1, · · · , xk−1, xk+1, · · · , xK ]T .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wiretap interference channel, where the legiti-
mate users are equipped with single antenna and the eaves-
dropper is equipped with multiple antennas as shown in Fig.1.
The baseband signal model at the receivers is given by
yk = hkkxk +
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
hkjxj + wk, ∀k ∈ K, (1)
yE =
K∑
j=1
hEjxj +wE, (2)
where the set of legitimate users is denoted by K =
{1, · · · ,K}. The received signal at k-th legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper is given by yk ∈ C and yE ∈ CM ,
respectively. The transmit signal from the k-th legitimate
transmitter is assumed to be taken from a Gaussian codebook
and is denoted by xk ∈ C. We assume that, the transmit signals
from the legitimate users follow independent and identical
distribution. In this paper, we distinguish between the antenna
noise (due to impedance mismatch) and the processing noise
(due to analog/digital signal processing tasks) at the receivers.
We model these noise entities as zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). Thus, the antenna noise at the
k-th legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
wk ∼ CN
(
0, ̺2k
)
and wE ∼ CN
(
0, ̺2EIM
)
, respectively.
Channel realization from the j-th transmitter to the k-th
receiver is given by hkj ∈ C, and the channel from the j-th
user to the eavesdropper is given by hEj ∈ CM . The channel
state information is known globally.
The malicious eavesdropper aims at wiretapping the signals
from the legitimate users. In the information decoding (ID)
chain, the received signal experiences extra noise, which is
originated from imperfect A/D conversion and digital process-
ing tasks. Taking this noise term into account, we obtain
yE =
K∑
j=1
hEjxj +wE + nE, (3)
where nE ∼ CN
(
0, σ2EIM
)
represents the processing noise
at the eavesdropper. As mentioned earlier, the legitimate re-
ceivers harvest the energy from the RF signal by PS structure.
Therefore, a portion of the received signal power undergoes
the information detection (ID) chain and the other portion
passes through the energy harvesting (EH) circuitry. The signal
passed to the ID chain and EH circuitry is given by
yIDk =
√
ηk
(
hkkxk +
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
hkjxj + wk
)
+ nk, ∀k ∈ K,
(4)
yEHk =
√
1− ηk
( K∑
j=1
hkjxj + wk
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (5)
where the processing noise at the k-th legitimate receiver is
denoted by nk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2k
)
. The achievable information rate
and harvested energy are then given by
Rk = I(xk; yIDk)
= log
(
1 +
ηkpk|hkk|2
σ2k + ηk(̺
2
k +
∑K
j=1
j 6=k
pj|hkj |2)
)
, ∀k ∈ K,
(6)
Ek = (1− ηk)
( K∑
j=1
pj |hkj |2 + ̺2k
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (7)
respectively, which guarantees reliable communication with
arbitrarily small decoding error. Notice that ηk is the PS
coefficient at the k-th legitimate receiver. The transmit power
from the k-th transmitter is denoted by pk := E[|xk|2].
Remark 1. In the interference-limited regime, i.e., for
η
∑K
j=1
j 6=k
pj |hkj |2 ≫ σ2k, ∀k ∈ K, the achievable communi-
cation rate reduction by PS is negligible.
For secure communication, the superposition region is given
by [12], [13]
∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
[∑
k∈S
I(xk; yIDk)− I(xS ;yE)
]+
, ∀S ⊆ K, (8)
where the secrecy rate for the k-th user is denoted by Rsk.
Notice that S is any subset of K, i.e., S ⊆ K.
Remark 2. With K legitimate users, there exists
(
K
1
)
individ-
ual secrecy rates constraints and
∑K
k=2
(
K
k
)
sum secrecy rates
constraints.
The negative term in the RHS in (8) can be written as
I(xS ;yE) =
∑
k∈S
I(xk;yE|x|S|k+1) :=
∑
k∈S
REk . (9)
By definition, we have I(xk;yE|x|S|k+1) = I(xk;yE) if k+1 >
|S|. Furthermore, we define x|S|k+1 = xk+1, if k+1 = |S|. With
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Fig. 2: Achievable secrecy rate region of the symmetric two-user
wiretap interference channel. Antenna and processing noise variance
are set to σk = ̺k = 0.25, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, σE = ̺E = 0.25. Transmit
power budget is pmax = 1. |hkk| = 1, ‖hEk‖ = 0.5, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
Gaussian codebooks, the term in (9) is given by [14],
∑
k∈S
REk =
log det

IM +∑
k∈S
pkhEkh
H
Ek
σ2E + ̺
2
E
(
IM +
∑
l∈Sc
plhElh
H
El
σ2E + ̺
2
E
)−1 .
(10)
By plugging (6) and (9) in (8), we get
K∑
k=1
Rsk ≤
[
K∑
k=1
Rk −REk
]+
. (13)
We define σ¯2E = σ
2
E + ̺
2
E.
Example: Consider the case of two legitimate users, K = 2.
Then, the achievable individual secrecy rates are constrained
by
Rs1 ≤
[
log
(
1 +
η1p1|h11|2
σ21 + η1(̺
2
1 + p2|h12|2)
)
−
log
(
1 +
p1
σ¯2E
hHE1Q
−1
1 hE1
)]+
, (14)
Rs2 ≤
[
log
(
1 +
η2p2|h22|2
σ22 + η2(̺
2
2 + p1|h21|2)
)
−
log
(
1 +
p2
σ¯2E
hHE2Q
−1
2 hE2
)]+
, (15)
where the matrices Q1 and Q2 are given by
Q1 = IM +
p2hE2h
H
E2
σ¯2E
, (16)
Q2 = IM +
p1hE1h
H
E1
σ¯2E
, (17)
respectively. Notice that, the matrices Q1 and Q2 coincide
with the interference-plus-noise covariance matrices at the
eavesdropper. Moreover, the sum secrecy rate is constrained
by (11) as given at the bottom of the page.
Therefore, achievable individual secrecy rates satisfying the
sum-rate constraint (11) are from the set Rs as
(Rs1, R
s
2) ∈ Rs =
{(
[R1 − R˜E1 ]+, [R2 − R˜E2 ]+
)
,
(
[R1 − RˆE1 ]+, [R2 − RˆE2 ]+
)}
, (18)
which also satisfy the constraints (14), (15). Notice that the
set Rs consists of 2 elements for K = 2. Hence, the convex-
hull of these rate tuples in Rs is also achievable. Assuming
zero EH constraints at the legitimate users, the achievable
secrecy rate region is depicted in Fig. 2. This set involves K!
elements for any arbitrary K . Any element of this set yields
an achievable set of secrecy rates lower-bound.
Rs1 +R
s
2 ≤

log
(
1 +
η1p1|h11|2
σ21 + η1(̺
2
1 + p2|h12|2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1
+ log
(
1 +
η2p2|h22|2
σ22 + η2(̺
2
2 + p1|h21|2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2
−
2∑
k=1
REk


+
, (11)
where
2∑
k=1
REk = log det
(
IM +
p1hE1h
H
E1
+ p2hE2h
H
E2
σ¯2E
)
= log
(
1 +
p1
σ¯2E
hHE1Q
−1
1 hE1
)
+ log
(
1 +
p2
σ¯2E
‖hE2‖2
)
=: R˜E1 + R˜E2
= log
(
1 +
p1
σ¯2E
‖hE1‖2
)
+ log
(
1 +
p2
σ¯2E
hHE2Q
−1
2 hE2
)
=: RˆE1 + RˆE2 . (12)
λα1
(
σ¯2E + p1h
H
E1
Q−11 hE1
) (
σ21 + η1̺
2
1 + η1p2|h12|2
)
σ¯2E
(
σ21 + η1̺
2
1 + η1
∑2
j=1 pj|h1j |2
) ≤ 1 (21)
λα2
(
σ¯2E + p2‖hE2‖2
) (
σ22 + η2̺
2
2 + η2p1|h21|2
)
σ¯2E
(
σ22 + η2̺
2
2 + η2
∑2
j=1 pj|h2j |2
) ≤ 1 (22)
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate Region
For simplicity in explanation and preserving clarity, we
elaborate the secrecy rate region acquisition process for the
case that K = 2. The proposed procedure can be readily ex-
tended for arbitrarily large K . Recall that for K = 2, we have
|Rs| = 2. Obtaining an element of the set Rs as (Rs1, Rs2),
the secrecy rate region can be obtained by formulating the
following weighted max-min optimization problem
max
η,p
min
(Rs1
α1
,
Rs2
α2
)
(19)
subject to Ek ≥ ψk, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, (19a)
p ≤ pmax, (19b)
0 ≤ η ≤ 1, (19c)
where p = [p1, p2] and η = [η1, η2]. Moreover, pmax =
[p1max , p2max ] is the power budget available at the users. The en-
ergy harvesting constraint is given by (19a), where the energy
demand of the k-th user is represented by ψk. The weight vec-
tor α = [α1, α2] is determined apriori with 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1, ∀k
and ‖α‖1 = 1. Notice that, with each realization of α we
obtain a secure achievable rate on the Pareto boundary of
the secrecy rate region. Hence, solving problem (19) for each
realization of α ∈ R2 with a predefined resolution, delivers
the secrecy rate region [15]. Problem (19) is a non-convex
problem. This is due to the non-convexity of the objective
function, which is the division of non-convex functions. By
defining an auxiliary variable β = min
(
Rs1
α1
,
Rs2
α2
)
, we transfer
the objective function into the constraint set. Then we obtain,
max
β,η,p
β (20)
subject to βαk ≤ Rsk, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, (20a)
(19a), (19b), (19c). (20b)
We can reformulate constraints (20a) as given in (21) and (22),
where λ = 2β . Since λ is monotonically increasing as a
function of β in optimization problem (20), we replace β with
λ. The energy harvesting constraints in (19a) are reformulated
as
ψk − σ2k + ηk
∑2
j=1 pj|hkj |2∑2
j=1 pj|hkj |2
≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}. (23)
Hence, we obtain
max
λ,η,p
λ subject to (21), (22), (23), (19b), (19c). (24)
The constraints (21) and (23) are divisions of posynomials,
which are not necessarily convex functions. This renders the
weighted max-min optimization problem into a signomial
program which is a NP-hard problem [16]. Next, we propose
a polynomial-time algorithm to obtain a sub-optimal solution.
We approximate the denominator of the functions in (21)
and (23) with a monomial function based on the single
condensation method [16]. This approximation is based on the
relation between arithmetic and geometric means [17]. For in-
stance, the denominator of constraint (23) can be approximated
as
2∑
j=1
pj |hkj |2 ≥
2∏
j=1
(
pj|hkj |2
ckj
)ckj
, (25)
where ckj , ∀j, controls the approximation gap given by
B =
2∑
j=1
pj |hkj |2 −
2∏
j=1
(
pj |hkj |2
ckj
)ckj
. (26)
Inequality (25) holds with equality with the optimal value of
ckj , ∀j, which is
c⋆kj =
pj|hkj |2∑K
j=1 pj |hkj |2
. (27)
Similar approximation is applied for the denominator of (21).
Notice that, c⋆kj is a function of the optimization parameters p.
Here, we tighten the approximation gap by optimizing over pj
and ηj , ∀j and using the solutions to obtain c⋆kj . Notice that
this c⋆kj is optimal only for the current iteration and suboptimal
for the next iteration. Furthermore, note that the matrix Q1 in
a function of p2 as Q1 = IM +
p2hE2h
H
E2
σ¯2
E
. In the proposed
iterative approach, we fix this matrix based on the solution
of p2 from the previous iteration, i.e., at iteration l we use
Q
(l)
1 = IM +
p
(l−1)
2 hE2h
H
E2
σ¯2E
.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider two legitimate users that are wiretapped by an
eavesdropper equipped with two antennas, i.e., K = M = 2.
We assume that the antenna noise and the processing noises
at the legitimate receivers and at the eavesdropper have the
variances, ̺2k = σ
2
k = 0.25, ∀k and ̺2E = σ2E = 0.25,
respectively. Moreover, the power budget at the transmitters
is assumed to be 1, i.e., pmax = 1. The achievable se-
crecy rate region Pareto-boundary of the wiretap interference
channel is characterized numerically based on the proposed
algorithm. In Fig. 3, the Pareto-boundary of the reliable and
the secure communication rates are depicted. Interestingly, for
weak interference channels Fig. 3(a), both reliable and secure
communication regions are convex by optimal power alloca-
tion. Hence, there is no need for time sharing between the
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Fig. 3: Comparison between the achievable reliable and secure communication rates. Antenna and processing noise variance are set to
σk = ̺k = 0.25, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, σE = ̺E = 0.25. Transmit power budget is pmax = 1. |hkk| = 1, ‖hEk‖ = 0.5, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
single-user decodable operating points. Similar observations
are made, with the energy harvesting demands at the legitimate
users. In the strong interference regime, power allocation does
not always provide an optimal solution. According to Fig. 3(b),
power allocation is the optimal strategy for the reliable com-
munication with EH demands. It turns out that, time-sharing
achieves a larger secrecy rate region for both cases, i.e., with
and without EH demands. Evidently, stronger interference
results in a lower achievable secrecy rates. Interestingly in
weak interference scenarios high EH demands are not feasible.
This can be observed in Fig. 3(a), where unity EH demands are
not feasible, however these demands are feasible for stronger
interference scenarios as can be seen in Fig. 3(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated the secrecy rate region of the wiretap
interference channel with energy harvesting constraints at
the legitimate users. The achievable secrecy rate region is
a function of power allocation and receiver PS coefficients.
Hence, optimal resource allocation is required to characterize
the secrecy rate region. We formulated the secrecy rate region
Pareto-boundary characterization problem as a weighted max-
min optimization problem. This turns out to be a non-convex
problem, for which we proposed a polynomial-time algorithm
to obtain a reliable sub-optimal solution. Interestingly, we
observe the shrinkage of reliable communication rate region
while granting both secrecy and energy. With energy demands
power transmission is required, which results in a shrinkage
in the rate region, however, it stays convex. But providing
secrecy, the convexity of the rate region is lost and it is optimal
to perform time-sharing.
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